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1 Introduction
More than five million U.S. homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure during
the past three years.1 An additional eleven million homeowners—about one out of every
four with a mortgage—are at risk of foreclosure because their homes are worth less than
what they owe to mortgage lenders (the mortgages are “underwater”).2 Federal and
state governments have made foreclosure prevention an important policy goal and have
repeatedly called on lenders to implement mortgage modification programs that would
reduce the balances and interest rates of struggling homeowners.3 Thus far, however,
these programs have been viewed as having limited success in addressing the foreclosure
crisis.4
An important challenge in designing cost-effective mortgage modification pro-
grams is developing eligibility criteria that efficiently identify homeowners who are
highly likely default unless they receive help. In practice, it is difficult to identify these
at-risk homeowners. Although millions of homeowners are “underwater” and therefore
at risk of default, the majority of these homeowners are still making timely mortgage
payments and may continue doing so without receiving a mortgage modification.5 It
could be quite costly to extend benefits to all of these underwater homeowners.
One approach to this problem is to extend benefits only to homeowners who
are delinquent. For example, a number of modification programs have made bene-
1Moody’s Analytics Regional Financial Review November 2010.
2March 2011 CoreLogic Data Release.
3We note that in times of adverse economic conditions, debt forgiveness and loan modification can
create value for both borrowers and lenders (Bolton and Rosenthal, 2002; Kroszner, 2003; and Piskorski
and Tchistyi, 2011). Moreover, because foreclosures may exert significant negative externalities (see,
for example, Campbell et al., 2009), it might be socially optimal to modify mortgage contracts to a
greater extent than lenders would select independently.
4The Obama administration, for example, has implemented the Home Affordable Mortgage Pro-
gram (HAMP), which encourages private lenders to reduce the monthly payments owed by struggling
homeowners. The program, however, has been generally viewed as a failure relative to its original
ambitions. See, for example, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (2011).
5See, for example, March 2011 Written Testimony of David H. Stevens Assistant Secretary of
Housing - Federal Housing Administration Commissioner U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
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fits available only to homeowners who failed to make at least two monthly mortgage
payments (such homeowners are at least “sixty days delinquent”).6 This approach,
however, could induce homeowners to default in order to obtain modification benefits
even though they would not have defaulted otherwise. Lenders and policymakers are
well aware of this “strategic behavior” problem. Nonetheless, some proponents of such
policies argue that the costs of delinquency are sufficiently high to deter strategic be-
havior by most homeowners. Seriously delinquent borrowers, for example, face higher
costs of accessing liquidity through credit cards, auto loans, and any new mortgages or
refinancings. Additionally, bounded rationality or moral considerations may decrease
a borrower’s ability or willingness to behave strategically (see, for example, Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2009)
An alternative way to target modification benefits—and one which alleviates the
risk of strategic behavior—is to offer these benefits only to homeowners who undergo
a rigorous audit that verifies that they are likely to default, or have defaulted, as a
result of meaningful adverse conditions.7 Such an audit, for example, would assess
the home’s value and the homeowner’s current income and credit rating. Because this
costly verification approach is time-consuming, however, it may fail to extend benefits
to homeowners before they enter foreclosure or decide to exit their homes, and could
thereby lead to higher costs for borrowers and lenders.
These alternatives to targeting modification benefits present a trade-off: one
approach extends benefits quickly using a simple delinquency requirement, but gener-
ates potential strategic behavior. Another approach extends benefits more slowly using
costly verification methods, minimizing strategic behavior, but potentially increases the
6The primary example of this approach is the Bank of America/Countrywide modification program.
Other programs, like the IndyMac/FDIC program, JP Chase Enhanced Program, Citi Homeowner-
ship Preservation Program, and GSE Streamlined Modification Program have also targeted seriously
delinquent borrowers, though some of them include additional eligibility requirements. See Citigroup
(2009).
7An example of this approach is HAMP, which contains multiple eligibility requirements along with
a trial period preceding any permanent modification.
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number of foreclosures and results in higher costs for borrowers and lenders. The key
factor affecting this trade-off is the extent to which simple delinquency requirements
generate strategic behavior.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the extent to which strategic
behavior is induced by modification programs that use simple delinquency require-
ments to target benefits. We study a recent modification program—implemented by
Countrywide Financial Corporation—that extended benefits to homeowners who were
at least sixty days delinquent. The Countrywide program was the product of litigation
commenced during Summer 2008 by U.S. state attorneys general, who alleged that
Countrywide had engaged in deceptive lending practices. In October 2008, as part of
a widely publicized Settlement, Countrywide agreed to modify all subprime mortgages
that it serviced throughout the nation beginning in December 2008.8
A centerpiece of this Settlement was Countrywide’s commitment to offer expe-
dited, unsolicited loan modifications to borrowers who were at least sixty days delin-
quent. Three features of the Countrywide Settlement—its unexpected public announce-
ment in advance of its implementation, its nationwide coverage, and its requirement
that a borrower be delinquent in order to receive benefits—make it a potentially useful
setting for assessing borrower behavior in response to the offer of mortgage modification
featuring a simple delinquency requirement.
We examine borrower responses to the public announcement of the Country-
wide Settlement using an extensive dataset with information about all privately se-
curitized mortgages, including the name of the servicer, origination mortgage amount
and interest rate, origination FICO, and monthly payment history. We match these
mortgage-level data to borrower-level data supplied by Equifax, one of the three ma-
jor credit bureaus. The Equifax data include the borrowers’ updated credit scores as
8Although Countrywide had recently been acquired by Bank of America, the Settlement applied
only to Countrywide mortgages.
5
well as their payment histories and utilization rates for credit cards, mortgages, second
liens, and other sources of credit. These unique data allow us to track homeowner
credit behavior during the months before and after an initial default on a mortgage
and examine the extent to which borrowers who default on mortgages pay their other
debts.
Most of our analysis focuses on 2/28 hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (Hybrid
ARMs), which were aimed primarily at subprime borrowers.9 These mortgages offer
a relatively low introductory “teaser” rate for the first two years, after which the rate
typically resets to a higher level (indexed to LIBOR or Treasury rates) for the remaining
28 years of the loan term. We show below that the loan characteristics of Countrywide’s
2/28 ARMs were comparable to those of other servicers prior to announcement of the
Settlement. We say that a borrower exhibits “strategic behavior” if he or she defaults
in response to the public announcement of the Settlement and would not have defaulted
otherwise, at least in the near term.
In a difference-in-difference framework, we estimate the percentage increase in
defaults among Countrywide borrowers during the months immediately following the
Settlement announcement relative to the percentage increase during the same period
among comparable borrowers who were unaffected by the Settlement because their
loans were not serviced by Countrywide (the “Control Group”). In regressions control-
ling for many borrower attributes, including current credit scores and indebtedness, we
find a thirteen percent increase in the overall probability that Countrywide 2/28 ARMs
loans roll straight from current to sixty days delinquent during the three months im-
mediately after the Settlement announcement (relative to a control group of loans with
non-Countrywide servicers).10 The effect of the Settlement rises to over twenty percent
9While the majority of subprime borrowers used 2/28 ARMs, we find similar results when we
examine the behavior of borrowers with 3/27 ARMs. These results are not reported to save space,
but are available from the authors upon request
10By “roll straight” we mean that the loans migrated from a “current” status to a “sixty-days
delinquent” status during a two month period, implying that previously-current (paid up) borrowers
missed two payments in a row.
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when we subset on borrowers with (i) greater access to liquidity through credit cards
and (ii) lower current combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios. These borrowers were
arguably less likely to default in the near term because they had significant untapped
liquidity through their credit cards or some positive equity in their homes.
We also find no effect of the Settlement on default rates among subprime Coun-
trywide borrowers with respect to debts (credit cards, second mortgages) that were
not targeted by the Settlement. In fact, Countrywide borrowers exhibit a very large
increase in the likelihood of being delinquent on their first mortgage while remaining
current on other debts relative to the control group.
We confirm that these results are not driven by idiosyncratic features of Coun-
trywide loans or borrowers. While most Countrywide mortgages were covered by the
Settlement, one product—non-subprime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)—were not eli-
gible for the modification program. We split FRMs into subprime and non-subprime
categories based on the initial FICO score of the borrower. We find no effect of the
Settlement on default rates among high quality FRMs that were not eligible for ben-
efits under the Settlement, but a strong effect of the Settlement on low quality FRMs
that were potentially eligible for benefits.
Together, these results inform ongoing discussions on the trade-off between (i)
quickly-implemented programs with simple but possibly manipulable eligibility criteria
and (ii) slowly-implemented programs with more rigorous verification of homeowner
distress. The Countrywide Settlement was a quickly-implemented program with a
simple eligibility criterion. We find non-trivial effects on strategic behavior—up to
over twenty percent relative increase in default rates among the borrowers least likely
to default otherwise—during the months immediately after its announcement. Further
research is needed to determine whether the costs of such strategic behavior are large
relative to the potential benefits of a simple modification program that quickly extends
benefits to a large number of homeowners.
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Previous studies of incentives and strategic behavior in the context of the recent
crisis have examined a number of questions, including the impact of bailouts on banks’
incentives to take risk,11 the likelihood that some lenders originated mortgages with
greater risk due to their ability to sell the loans in the securitized market,12 and the
impact of securitization on servicer decisions to foreclose or renegotiate delinquent
loans.13 Little attention has been given so far to strategic behavior among homeowners.
Our analysis is also broadly connected to the household finance literature, sur-
veyed by Campbell (2006) and Tufano (2009), especially the recent empirical literature
examining household motives behind mortgage defaults. Most of this recent literature
aims to assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default: neg-
ative equity and illiquidity.14 Guiso et al. (2009) also explore how moral and social
considerations affect the decision to default on a mortgage. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first to assess the effect of mortgage modification programs on
incentives to default on a mortgage.
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature examining the effects of
various policies on household behavior, such as the impact of unemployment insurance
on workers’ incentives to work.15 We contribute to this literature by examining the
effects of mortgage modification policy on borrowers’ incentives to repay their loans.
Finally, our paper helps inform the empirical literature on contract renegotia-
tion.16
11See Farhi and Tirole (2009) and Poole (2009), for example.
12Keys, et al. (2010, 2011), Mian and Sufi (2009), Berndt and Gupta (2009), and Purnanandam
(2010) provide evidence suggesting that originators might have made riskier loans when they were
able to securitize these loans.
13Piskorski et al. (2010) show that bank-held delinquent loans were foreclosed at a lower rate
relative to comparable mortgages that were securitized. Agarwal et al. (2011) corroborate their
findings and provide further evidence that bank-held loans were much more likely to be renegotiated
than comparable securitized mortgages.
14See, among others, Foote et al. (2008), Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010), and Elul et al. (2010). See
also Mian and Sufi (2011) who examine the role of the home equity-based borrowing channel in the
recent crisis using a data set consisting of individual credit files.
15See, for example, Meyer (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002).
16See, among others, recent research by Benmelech and Bergman (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009)
in the context of corporate default, and Matvos (2009) for renegotiation in NFL football contracts.
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Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Countrywide
Settlement and our hypotheses regarding its effects on homeowner behavior. Sections 3
and 4 describe our data and empirical methodology. We present our results in Section
5 and discuss their implications for the design of mortgage modification policies in
Section 6.
2 Countrywide Settlement and Hypotheses
2.1 The Settlement
In June 2008, attorneys general in California and Illinois brought suit against
Countrywide, alleging deceptive lending practices. The California complaint, for ex-
ample, alleged that Countrywide had “implemented [a] deceptive scheme through mis-
leading marketing practices designed to sell risky and costly loans to homeowners, the
terms and dangers of which they did not understand.”17 Over the next three months,
similar suits were brought by attorneys general in over thirty other states.
On October 6, 2008, Countrywide entered a multi-state Settlement, pursuant to
which it agreed to extend offers of loan modification to all seriously delinquent or near-
delinquent subprime first-mortgage loans18 that it services throughout the nation.19 It
is irrelevant whether the loan was originated by Countrywide, whether it is securitized
17State of California (2008a, p. 5). See also State of Illinois (2008).
18The Settlement defined a subprime first mortgage as one that “is identified as such in connection
with a securitization in which it is part of the pool of securitized assets or, in the case of a [Countrywide]
Residential Mortgage Loan that is not included in a securitization, was classified as being ‘subprime’
on the systems of [Countrywide] and its subsidiaries on June 30, 2008. ‘Subprime Mortgage Loans’
do not include first-lien residential mortgage loans that are Federal Eligible.” Countrywide (2008, p.
5).
19A summary of the settlement is provided by a “Multistate Settlement Term Sheet” (see Country-
wide, 2008). More detailed terms are provided by State of California (2008b), among other sources.
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or held in Countrywide’s portfolio,20 whether it previously received a modification, or
whether the borrower’s home is encumbered by a second mortgage or junior lien.
The Settlement targets subprime first mortgages currently serviced by Country-
wide, including Hybrid ARMs, Option ARMs, and FRMs. To qualify for modification,
the mortgage and borrower must satisfy four criteria: The loan must have originated
before 2008 and have been within Countrywide’s servicing portfolio on June 30, 2008;
the borrower’s loan-to-value ratio (LTV) must be at least seventy-five percent; pay-
ments of principal or interest must be sixty or more days delinquent (or likely to become
delinquent as a result of an interest rate reset or negative amortization trigger); and the
borrower’s post-modification mortgage payments must not exceed certain thresholds.21
Non-subprime FRMs are not eligible for modification under the Settlement.
Countrywide’s obligations under the Settlement depend on when the mortgages
became delinquent and on the mortgage type. With respect to subprime Hybrid ARMs,
which are the primary focus of this paper, borrowers should receive unsolicited restora-
tion of the introductory interest rate for five years if they were current prior to their
first rate reset and became sixty days delinquent immediately afterwards. Countrywide
must offer this modification to a homeowner without requiring new loan documentation
or verification of the borrower’s income. Additionally, all seriously delinquent Hybrid
ARM borrowers—regardless of when they became delinquent—must be considered for
some type of interest-rate modification. One type would reduce the initial interest
rate for five years (to as low as 3.5 percent), after which the loan would be converted
to an FRM at a low rate. Another type of modification would introduce a ten-year
20Although securitization agreements often limit the servicer’s authority to modify mortgages
(Mayer, Morrison, and Piskorski 2009), Countrywide stated, “it currently has, or reasonably ex-
pects to obtain, discretion to pursue the foreclosure avoidance measures outlined in this agreement for
the substantial majority of Qualifying Mortgages. Where [Countrywide] does not enjoy discretion to
pursue these foreclosure avoidance measures, [Countrywide] will use its best effort to seek appropriate
authorization from investors.” Countrywide (2008, p. 4).
21The threshold is forty-two percent of income if taxes and insurance are escrowed and thirty-four
percent of income otherwise.
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interest-only period and also reduce the (adjusting) interest rate over the life of the
loan (to as low as 3.5 percent).
Countrywide agreed to be proactive in contacting borrowers eligible for mod-
ifications under the Settlement. Although it made this commitment on October 6,
2008, it announced that it would not be ready to contact borrowers until December
1, 2008.22 Countrywide also agreed to reach out to Hybrid ARM borrowers whose
mortgage payments were scheduled to change after the Settlement. These borrowers
would be encouraged to contact Countrywide if they expected to have trouble making
the new payments. Finally, Countrywide agreed to suspend the foreclosure process for
any borrower who might be eligible for a modification. The suspension should last as
long as necessary to determine borrower eligibility.
2.2 Public Awareness of the Settlement
The Countrywide Settlement was widely reported in October 2008, prior to its
nationwide rollout in December 2008. Figure 1 documents the sudden interest in the
Settlement during this period: as reported by Google Trends, internet searches for
the term “Countrywide Modification” spiked in October, as newspapers around the
country announced the Settlement. Search activity increased steadily thereafter.
Internet discussion forums also show that Countrywide borrowers were well
aware that the Settlement targeted borrowers who were at least sixty days delinquent.
In one forum, borrowers report that they were in touch with Countrywide as early
as October 2008 regarding their eligibility and that they were told that benefits were
22In a press release, for example, the Attorney General for Washington State explained that “Coun-
trywide said the loan modification program will be ready for implementation by December 1, 2008,
and that the company would engage in proactive outreach to eligible customers at that point.” See
http://www.atg.wa.gov/countrywidePR100608.aspx.
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available to borrowers who were sixty days delinquent. Some forum participants also
indicate that they missed mortgage payments in order to qualify for benefits.23
Countrywide was aware of the potential for strategic behavior. Its Settlement
included a provision stating that, if it “detects material levels of intentional nonper-
formance by borrowers that appears to be attributable to the introduction of the loan
modification program, it reserves the right to require objective prequalification of bor-
rowers for loan modifications under the program and to take other reasonable steps.”24
It appears that this provision was not widely reported and may not have deterred
homeowners from strategically defaulting on their mortgages in order to qualify for
modifications.
2.3 Hypotheses
We view the Settlement as a unique opportunity to assess homeowner response
to sudden announcement of a modification policy using simple but manipulable qualifi-
cation criteria. Most of our analysis focuses on 2/28 hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages
(2/28 ARMs), a type of loan primarily targeted by the Settlement and very com-
mon among subprime borrowers.25 These mortgages offer a relatively low introductory
“teaser” rate for the first two or three years, after which the rate typically resets to a
higher level (indexed to LIBOR or Treasury rates) for the remaining 28 years of the
loan term.
23The information reported in this paragraph is drawn from comments posted at
http://loanworkout.org/2009/02/countrywide-idiots/. This site includes statements such as: ”We
started the process back in Oct of 2008. We have an ARM with a 8.75% rate currently. We have
applied for a rate reductions but were told we would have to be delinquent on our account to qualify.”;
”We received a loan modification agreement in December, but this was after we were told not to make
a mortgage payment, because if we made a payment and we were current we would not qualify.”;
“In order to get the help we were requesting, we had to go from having an excellent pay history to
completely tarnishing our record by missing 2 months of payments...so we skipped our payments for 2
months.”; ”We would not even be behind if they did not advise us to enter into the loan modification
and not send any payments in until it was approved or denied!”
24Multi-State Settlement, p. 9.
25Mayer et al. (2009) report that among subprime borrowers, over 75 percent of mortgages originated
over the 2003–2007 period were of the hybrid type.
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Assuming the announcement was an exogenous shock—an assumption we justify
in the next section—we propose the following differences-in-differences (DD) estimation
strategy: Relative to the same type of mortgages held by comparable borrowers and
serviced by other servicers, were Countrywide 2/28 ARMs more likely to roll from cur-
rent to sixty days delinquent during the period immediately after public announcement
of the Settlement? By abruptly stopping payment, homeowners could make themselves
eligible for the benefits of the Settlement.
We test for this DD effect beginning in October 2008, the month of Settle-
ment announcement. There is, however, a potential confound beginning in early
2009. In February of that year the federal government announced plans to implement
a widespread modification program, the Home Affordable Mortgage Plan (HAMP),
which went on-line in March 2009.26 This program may have affected homeowner
behavior, across all servicers, possibly in much the same way as the Countrywide Set-
tlement. It is a potential confound because its effect on Countrywide borrowers, who
may have already obtained modifications pursuant to the Countrywide Settlement, may
differ from its effect on non-Countrywide borrowers, who may have been more likely
to apply for and obtain benefits under the HAMP. To avoid the potential confound,
we focus our analysis on the behavior of borrowers during the first few months after
Settlement announcement (October 2008 to February 2009).
To be sure, an increase in the delinquency rate among Countrywide borrowers
(relative to those in the Control Group) does not necessarily show that they were acting
strategically to become eligible for modification. They may have been struggling to
make monthly mortgage payments and been likely to default in the near future. The
Settlement announcement may only have convinced them to default slightly earlier
than they would have otherwise. Such defaults are not strategic because the borrowers
were already distressed and likely to default.
26Bob Willis, “HUD’s Donovan Says U.S. to ‘Accelerate’ Mortgage Modification,” Bloomberg (Feb.
7, 2009).
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To assess whether economic distress—rather than strategic behavior—is driving
excess post-Settlement defaults among Countrywide borrowers (relative to the Control
Group), we examine the behavior of homeowners who were least likely to default when
the Settlement was announced: (i) homeowners with substantial available credit on
their credit cards (equal to at least five times their monthly mortgage payment) and
(ii) homeowners with lower current CLTV ratios. Because these homeowners had access
to significant amounts of additional liquidity, or might have had some positive equity
left in their houses, they were less likely to default in the absence of a modification
program, at least in the near future. If we observe a rise in delinquency rates among
these homeowners, we think it is suggestive of strategic behavior by those impacted by
the Settlement, rather than changes in other economic factors that might be coincident
with announcement of the Settlement.
As an additional test of strategic behavior, we examine the behavior of home-
owners with respect to debts that were not targeted by the Settlement. The Settlement
obligated Countrywide to modify the terms of subprime first mortgages only; debts aris-
ing from second mortgages and credit cards were unaffected. If strategic behavior—not
economic distress—induced excess defaults on Countrywide subprime first mortgages,
we do not expect to observe excess defaults (relative to the Control Group) with respect
to non-targeted debts during the period immediately after Settlement announcement.
Relatedly, if strategic behavior is an important driver of post-Settlement excess
defaults among Countrywide borrowers, we expect to find that Countrywide borrowers
were more likely to default on subprime first mortgages while remaining current on
non-targeted debts immediately after the Settlement announcement. For example, the
probability of defaulting on subprime first mortgages while remaining current on second
liens should have increased among Countrywide borrowers, relative to the Control
Group, immediately after the announcement.
Finally, we consider the behavior of borrowers with FRMs. While hybrid ARMs
are a risky mortgage product usually targeted at subprime borrowers, FRMs are a
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more conventional mortgage product that are often taken out by prime borrowers who
would not have qualified for modification under the Settlement. We might observe
a response to Settlement announcement among subprime FRM borrowers, but we do
not expect to observe a response among non-subprime FRMs. This comparison is
particularly useful because it tests whether the Settlement announcement altered the
behavior of some but not all Countrywide borrowers. We can therefore assess whether
the post-Settlement increase in Countrywide defaults (relative to the Control group)
reflects strategic behavior among targeted borrowers (those with subprime FRMs) or
just a generalized rise in default rates across all Countrywide borrowers, including
non-targeted homeowners (those with non-subprime FRMs).
3 Data
Our primary dataset links two databases: (i) loan-level mortgage data col-
lected by BlackBox Logic and (ii) borrower-level credit report information collected by
Equifax.
BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic dataset
with information about twenty-one million privately securitized Subprime, Alt-A, and
Prime loans originated after 1999. These loans account for about ninety percent of
all privately securitized mortgages from that period. The BlackBox data, which are
obtained from mortgage servicers and securitization trustees, include static information
taken at the time of origination, such as mortgage date and amount, FICO credit
score, servicer name, interest rate, term, and interest rate type. The BlackBox data
also include dynamic data on monthly payments, mortgage balances, and delinquency
status.
Equifax is a credit reporting agency that provides monthly data on borrowers’
current credit scores, payments and balances on mortgage and installment debt, and
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balances and credit utilization for revolving debt (such as credit cards and HELOCs).
Equifax reports Vantage as the credit score. Intended to be comparable to FICO, the
Vantage score was designed by the three credit reporting bureaus (Equifax, Experian,
and TransUnion) to measure overall borrower credit health. Vantage scores range from
501 to 990.
Credit information from Equifax is linked to the BlackBox sample. The ini-
tial linkage was performed by 1010Data, a provider of data warehousing and process-
ing, using a proprietary match algorithm. We impose four restrictions on the merged
BlackBox-Equifax data in order to create a “Base Sample.” First, we restrict the data
to the types of loans that might have been eligible for the Countrywide Settlement,
namely first-lien mortgages on residential properties that were the owners’ primary
residences (we excluded mortgages on properties that were purchased as second homes
or by investors). First-liens were identifed as loans with the following characteristics
in the BlackBox dataset: (i) a lien type of “first” or “unknown” and (ii) a current or
origination mortgage balance that was within five percent of the current or origination
balance reported for the largest two first mortgages in the Equifax dataset. Second,
we retain only loans that were originated during 2005, 2006, and the first half of 2007.
Third, we exclude mortgages with an origination LTV less than seventy. Borrowers
with lower LTVs are unlikely to have been subprime borrowers at the time of origina-
tion. Finally, we exclude mortgages serviced by Citibank, IndyMac, and J.P. Morgan,
all of which implemented modification programs around the time that the Settlement
was announced. We are interested in comparing the behavior of Countrywide borrow-
ers to that of similar borrowers who were not offered a modification benefits around
the time of the announcement. After imposing these restrictions, we obtain a Base
Sample that includes about 574,000 2/28 ARMs and 705,000 FRMs.
Although 1010Data was able to link every BlackBox mortgage to an Equifax
credit report, 1010Data had a high degree of confidence about the linkage in only a
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minority of the cases. To minimize the risk of poor quality linkages, we created a
“Matched Sample” on which we perform all analysis involving Equifax covariates. We
exclude from the Matched Sample any observation for which the borrower zip code
reported in Equifax does not match the property zip code in the BlackBox dataset at
the beginning of our analysis period (December 2007-January 2008). This exclusion
omits mismatched loans at the level of zip code and provides additional verification
that owner-occupants held the loans in our sample. Due to this exclusion, the Matched
Sample is smaller than the Base sample and includes about 394,000 2/28 ARMs and
524,000 FRMs.
Because the Equifax data include information about current balances on other
mortgages held by the borrower, we are able to compute a dynamic combined loan
balance for each property. We can then calculate a current CLTV using zip-level home
prices indices provided by Zillow.27 To avoid the possibility of including liens from
other properties when computing loan balances, we compute a current CLTV only for
borrowers with no more than one closed-end second lien.
In the analysis below, we report results both for the full Base Sample as well
as the smaller Matched Sample. Variables provided by Equifax are used as covariates
only in the Matched Sample.
4 Methodology
Our objective is to measure the effect of the Countrywide Settlement on bor-
rower behavior immediately after it was announced in October 2008. To do this,
we implement a differences-in-differences (DD) approach that compares Countrywide
mortgages (treatment group) to comparable mortgages (control group) before and after
the Settlement announcement.
27For both the Base and Matched Samples, we use the MAPLE/Geocorr2k engine provided by the
Missouri Census to link property zip code to Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
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For our analysis of a particular class of mortgages (2/28 ARMs, subprime FRMs,
and non-subprime FRMs), we select as a Control Group the same class of loans serviced
by institutions other than Countrywide, excluding Citibank, IndyMac, and J.P. Morgan
for the reasons given above. As we show below, Countrywide and Control Group loans
(within a given class of mortgage) exhibit small differences in observable attributes
both at origination and at time the Settlement was announced. Additionally, there is
little change in these observable attributes around the time of the announcement. This
is unsurprising because, during the period when loans in our sample were originated
(2005-2007), the market for subprime lending was extremely competitive. Mortgage
brokers typically accessed databases that listed mortgage terms for many wholesale
lenders.
Although the Countrywide and Control Group loans are similar along observ-
able dimensions, one might be concerned that unobservable differences are potentially
important because Countrywide was sued while other mortgage lenders and servicers
were not (an omitted variable bias). Alternatively, one might be concerned that the
lawsuit itself was triggered by already-mounting delinquencies among Countrywide
loans (a reverse causality problem). While potentially troubling, we do not believe
that these issues generate an appreciable bias in our results. First, state attorneys
general appear to have selected Countrywide as a defendant because it was the largest
originator and servicer of subprime mortgages and was still solvent at the time of the
lawsuits (its financial distress was resolved through its acquisition by “deep-pocketed”
Bank of America). Other subprime originators, such as New Century and IndyMac,
had already collapsed and either filed for bankruptcy or been placed into receivership
by the federal government. Second, although Countrywide allegedly failed to disclose
all features of its mortgage products, its lending practices may not have differed sub-
stantially from those of other institutions, who appear to have limited their disclosures
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to borrowers as well.28 Finally, as we show below, the homeowners who responded
most strongly to the Settlement were borrowers with relatively high available liquid-
ity (through credit cards) and low current CLTV. Not only were these borrowers the
least likely to default in the absence of the Settlement, but there is little evidence of a
pre-Settlement increase in the delinquency rates of these borrowers relative to Control
group. These findings are inconsistent with the notion that post-Settlement increases
in delinquency rates are merely a continuation of pre-existing trends.
For these reasons, we view the Countrywide Settlement as a plausibly exoge-
nous shock to Countrywide mortgages, which are closely similar to mortgages serviced
by other institutions. Nonetheless, our analysis below includes detailed controls for
time-varying mortgage terms and borrower characteristics, as well as Countrywide-
specific fixed effects interacted with time dummies (which allow us to observe any
pre-Settlement changes in delinquency rates among Countrywide or Control Group
mortgages).29 Even if similar borrowers were offered different terms by Countrywide
than by other services, our controls should capture this heterogeneity.
In sum, our identification assumption is that, in the absence of the Settlement,
comparable Countrywide and Control Group loans would display similar payment pat-
terns (up to a constant difference) during the period of study.
4.1 Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group Loans
Tables 1, 8, and 9 (see Appendix for tables 8 and 9) help justify our identifying
assumption that Countrywide and Control Group servicers had similar borrower bases
28See, e.g., Lacko and Pappalardo (2007). Moreover, it is not clear whether any differences in
disclosure policies would have affected borrowers’ choices. Using data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, Bucks and Pence (2008) report that although most borrowers seem to know basic mortgage
terms, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages appear likely to underestimate or not know how
much their interest rates could change.
29In unreported regressions, we also included fixed effects for the top five servicers, fully interacted
with pre- and post-Settlement time dummies. Results from those regressions were comparable to
those reported below.
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with comparable loan terms around the time of Settlement announcement. The tables
present summary statistics for the stock of mortgages that were current sixty days
prior to September 2008. The summary statistics include characteristics of the loans
at origination and as of September 2008, the month just before public announcement
of the Settlement on October 6, 2008.
Table 1 focuses on 2/28 ARMs. Measured at means, Countrywide and Control
Group loans had similar CLTVs, interest rates, and credit scores: origination and
current CLTV differ by at most 2.1 points, origination and current interest rates differ
by at most eleven basis points, and origination FICO and current Vantage differ by at
most 1 point. Origination balances differ by about $10,000, less than ten percent of the
standard deviation. Available utilization on credit cards (“Months of Utilization”) is
measured by first computing the difference between (i) the total credit limit available
on all credit cards and (ii) the total amount charged to all credit cards. This difference
is then divided by the monthly mortgage payment. Thus, the variable “5+ Months
Utilization” measures the proportion of borrowers who had sufficient remaining credit
card utilization that they could charge the equivalent of at least five monthly mortgage
payments. Comparing Countrywide and Control Group borrowers, Table 1 shows
comparable levels of credit card utilization.
Tables 8 and 9 present the same summary statistics for subprime and non-
subprime FRMs. We define a loan as “subprime” if the borrower’s origination FICO
was less than 620. Subprime and non-subprime loans are comparable across most
dimensions, including origination and current CLTV, origination FICO and current
Vantage, origination balance, and credit card utilization. Substantial differences exist,
however, with respect to initial and current interest rates. Among subprime FRMs,
both origination and current interest rates are about 76 basis points lower for Coun-
trywide loans (over fifty percent of the standard deviation for each variable). Among
non-subprime FRMs, both origination and current interest rates are 30 basis points
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lower for Countrywide loans (again over fifty percent of the standard deviation). Note,
however, that the differences between Countrywide and Control Group loans are vir-
tually identical both at origination and at the beginning of the analysis period. A
persistent difference between treatment and control groups is consistent with our iden-
tifying assumption.
Figures 3 through 5 (see Appendix) explore our identifying assumption further
for 2/28 ARMs. They track the evolution of interest rates, Vantage scores, and CLTV
among 2/28 ARMs over time by quarter of origination. Figure 3 plots current interest
rates and shows that Countrywide and Control Group loans generally track each other
during the months preceding the Settlement announcement. We do see small differences
in interest rates during the quarter following the reset date: Countrywide loans tend
to reset to a higher average interest rate than Control Group loans. This suggests
that Countrywide loans may have been riskier than those in the Control Group. We
account for this difference by controlling for variation in interest rates over time in the
regressions reported below.
Figures 4 and 5 show that Vantage scores and CLTV evolved in nearly identical
patterns for Countrywide and Control Group loans. The current Vantage score was
virtually identical across the two groups during the months preceding the Settlement
announcement: the difference never exceeds ten Vantage score points (less than twelve
percent of a standard deviation) in any origination quarter. Similarly, CLTV is very
similar across Countrywide and Control Group loans in all origination vintages except
the fourth quarter of 2005, and even in that vintage the difference is consistently below
five percentage points over time.30
We observe similar patterns among FRMs. Overall, these patterns point to a
close comparability across Countrywide and Control Group loans before the Settlement
was announced in October 2008. As some variation between these two groups could
30Moreover, we note that loans originated in Q4 2005 account for less than 4% of our observations.
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be due to differences in the timing and mix of mortgages originated, we include a wide
range of controls (for loan, loan pool, and individual borrower characteristics) in the
regressions reported below.
4.2 Empirical Specification
We estimate a probit specification of the following form:
Pr(Yit = 1|Currentt−2) = Φ(α+β·CW it+µ·Oct-Decit+δ·CW it·Oct-Decit+γ·Xit) (1)
The dependent variable is the probability that a mortgage becomes sixty days past due
in month t (Yit = 1), conditional upon being current sixty days (two months) earlier
(Currentt−2). We call this the “rollover rate” from current to sixty days delinquent.
CWit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is serviced by Countrywide.
Oct-Decit is another dummy, taking the value 1 if month t occurs during the period
October through December 2008. October 2008 is the first month during which we
would observe a borrower response to announcement of the Settlement on October 6,
2008.31 Because the federal government announced HAMP in early 2009—a potential
confound as discussed above—we focus primarily on the three months (ending in De-
cember) after the Settlement announcement.32 Xit is a vector of loan and borrower
characteristics that includes variables such as initial Vantage score and the change in
Vantage score from origination to the current period, initial and current CLTV, orig-
ination quarter, initial interest rate and loan balance, the magnitude of any interest
rate reset, dummies for each quarter before and after the Settlement announcement,
and interactions between these time dummies and the Countrywide indicator (CWit).
31Our data record the payment status of the borrower as of the end of a given month. For example,
a borrower who is thirty-days delinquent in September will be recorded as being sixty-days delinquent
in October if no new payments were received by the end of October. Thus, a delinquency status in
October 2008 is the first record that could reflect a borrower’s decisions made after the Settlement
announcement.
32We include January and February 2009 in our analysis, however, because HAMP was not formally
announced until March 2009.
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The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the “difference in difference:”
the (i) difference between Countrywide and Control Group borrowers with respect to
the (ii) change in rollover rates between the quarter immediately before the Settlement
announcement (July-September 2008) to quarter immediately after (October-December
2008). Standard errors are clustered by mortgage.33 The estimation period runs from
January 2008 to February 2009.
We also estimate equation (1) separately for subsamples of loans with the same
origination quarter. This allows us to control more carefully for heterogeneity across
loans due to vintage-specific effects, such as the date of an interest rate reset.
5 Results
We observe a marked increase in delinquency rates among Countrywide loans,
relative to the Control Group, immediately after the Settlement announcement. Figure
2 plots the quarterly probability that non-delinquent (“current”) 2/28 ARMs become
sixty days past due (the “sixty-day rollover rate”). The averages are displayed for
each of the three quarters preceding the Settlement announcement, the quarter just
after the announcement (Oct-Dec 2008), and the Jan-Feb 2009 period. The sixty-day
rollover rate is the primary dependent variable in our regressions below because the
Settlement targets borrowers who are at least 60-days delinquent on their mortgages.
The top panel of Figure 2 examines all loans. The middle panel subsets on “low
utilization” borrowers: those who had sufficiently large liquidity available to them
through credit cards that they could charge the equivalent of five or more months of
mortgage payments when they become delinquent on their mortgages. The bottom
panel subsets on borrowers whose mortgages had a CLTV less then 100 percent at
the time of their delinquency. These low utilization and low CLTV borrowers were
33We obtain comparable results with standard errors clustered by mortgage servicer.
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arguably less likely to default in the near term because they had significant untapped
liquidity through their credit cards or some positive equity in their homes.
The top panel of Figure 2 shows a significant increase in the sixty-day rollover
rate of Countrywide loans relative to the Control Group (top panel) during the October-
December 2008 period, the first quarter in which we could observe an effect of the Set-
tlement announcement. However, we also observe an increase in the delinquency rate
of Countrywide loans relative to Control Group in the quarter immediately preceding
the Settlement announcement, suggesting the possibility of a pre-Settlement trend in
delinquency rates.
This pre-Settlement increase in the delinquency rate of Countrywide loans rel-
ative to Control Group is less evident when we subset on “low utilization” borrowers
in the middle panel of Figure 2. Here we continue to see a significant increase in the
rollover rate among Countrywide loans, relative to the Control group, after Settle-
ment announcement. But for these borrowers we observe only a slight pre-Settlement
increase in Countrywide rollover rates relative to the Control Group.
When we subset on low CLTV borrowers in the bottom panel of Figure 2, we
again observe a substantial post-Settlement increase in Countrywide delinquencies rel-
ative to the Control Group. But we also observe virtually no pre-Settlement difference
between Countrywide and the Control Group.
Overall, Figure 2 suggests that a number of Countrywide borrowers might have
missed payments in response to the Settlement announcement. Although we observe a
pre-Settlement increase in delinquencies among Countrywide borrowers, relative to the
Control Group, the increase appears to be driven primarily by the lowest quality loans
(borrowers with relatively high utilization of credit cards and high CLTVs). Among
more creditworthy borrowers we observe little relative change in delinquencies prior
to the Settlement announcement, suggesting that our identification assumptions are
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reasonable at least with respect to these borrowers. Indeed, as we will show next, af-
ter controlling for observables, we do not find a statistically significant pre-Settlement
increase in the relative delinquency rate among low utilization and low CLTV Country-
wide borrowers. Instead, we find that their delinquency rates increased substantially,
relative to the Control Group, immediately after the announcement.
5.1 Baseline Model of Settlement Effects
Table 2 implements equation (1) for Hybrid 2/28 ARMs. Column (1) estimates
the model using the full Base Sample, but includes only a minimal set of controls: time
dummies, a Countrywide dummy, and interactions between the Countrywide and time
dummies. The time dummies identify the months (usually quarters) before and after
Settlement announcement. The excluded category is July-September 2008, the quar-
ter immediately preceding announcement. The final time dummy—Jan-Feb 2009—
includes only two months because we stop our analysis in February 2009, the month
before the HAMP was announced. These time dummies, along with the Countrywide
× Time interactions, control for time-varying differences between Countrywide and
Control Group loans.
Column (2) adds additional controls from BlackBox, listed in Table 1. These
controls include a wide range of loan- and borrower-level characteristics, such as orig-
ination FICO, initial CLTV, current LTV, initial interest rate and any change in rate
over time. Column (2) also includes MSA fixed effects,34 dummies that identify loans
that had reset within the preceding three or six months, and interactions between these
reset variables and the Countrywide dummy (see Table 10 in the Appendix for the full
set of coefficients). These variables account for heterogeneity across loans and system-
atic differences between Countrywide and the Control Group, including the possibility
34In unreported regressions, we obtained virtually identical results when we included both State
dummies and State × Time interactions.
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that Countrywide mortgages experienced higher default rates at rate resets or during
other time periods. Together, the variables allow us to test whether post-Settlement
differences between Countrywide and the Control Group are significantly different from
pre-Settlement differences.
Columns (3) and (4) analyze the Matched Sample: Column (3) includes the
same controls as in Column (2); Column (4) includes the full set of Equifax controls,
including information about second liens, credit card utilization, and current credit
scores (Vantage). Column (4) also uses current and origination CLTV, whereas prior
columns use current and origination LTV.
The key covariate is the Countrywide × Oct-Dec 2008 interaction, which tests
whether the difference in rollover rates between Countrywide and the Control Group
is greater immediately after the Settlement announcement than immediately before
(the omitted category is July to September 2008). The coefficients in these tables
are marginal effects and can be compared to the mean monthly rollover rate among
Countrywide loans during the July to September 2008 period, as reported at the bottom
of the table (“Avg. Delinquency”).35
Across all columns in Table 2, the Countrywide × Oct-Dec 2008 interaction
is positive, highly significant, and economically meaningful. Relative to the pre-
Settlement rollover rate among Countrywide loans (between 4.8 and 4.9 percent, as
shown in the bottom panel), the effect ranges from twenty-three percent in Column
(1) to fifteen percent in Column (2) to thirteen percent in Columns (3) and (4). Be-
cause the magnitude of the effect does not vary substantially between Columns (2) and
(3), we conclude that restricting our attention to the Matched Sample does not bias
our inference. In the regressions reported below, we use the specification reported in
35Following Kremer and Snyder (2010) and Puhani (2008), we do not make the adjustments recom-
mended by Ai and Norton (2003) because our interaction measures a difference-in-difference treatment
effect.
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Column (4) (this is our “preferred specification”).36
While strongly statistically significant and economically meaningful (in relative
terms), these effects are derived from a model that implicitly constrains the effect of
the Settlement announcement to be the same for all loan vintages. The Settlement,
however, could have impacted some loan vintages more than others. By its terms, it
targeted loans that reset around or after the Settlement announcement. We therefore
separately examined loans by vintage to determine whether the effect is larger for some
vintages than others. In particular, we reran the specification in Column (4) for each
quarterly origination cohort (see Table 11 in the Appendix). Our regressions show that
the relative increase in delinquency for Countrywide loans is present in a number of
origination cohorts. The fact that we find these results among cohorts that were not
resetting around the Settlement announcement alleviates the concern that these results
are driven by unobservable differences between Countrywide and the Control Groups
around the reset date (note also that our regressions control for the magnitude of any
interest rate reset).
5.2 Settlement Effects by Credit Card Utilization and CLTV
The baseline models in Table 2 present two inferential problems. First, although
they report a marked post-Settlement increase in the rollover rate of Countrywide
loans relative to the Control Group, this increase does not necessarily reflect strategic
behavior. It could instead reflect an increase in defaults by economically distressed
borrowers who were already highly likely to default in the near term. Second, the
coefficients in Table 2 reveal a pre-Settlement increase in rollover rates of Countrywide
36We obtained qualitatively similar results in unreported regressions that augment the specification
in Column (4) to include fixed effects identifying each of the top five non-Countrywide mortgage
servicers (other, smaller servicers comprised the omitted category). These servicer fixed effects were
interacted with each of the quarterly time dummies. The Countrywide×Oct-Dec interaction remained
positive, highly significant, and economically large. It was also greater than and statistically different
from each “Servicer” × Oct-Dec interaction for the non-Countrywide servicers.
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loans relative to Control group. Although the estimated pre-Settlement increase in
relative delinquency rates of Countrywide loans is (about fifty percent) smaller than
the estimated post-Settlement increase, one could argue that a pre-existing trend, not
the Settlement announcement, possibly explains part of the post-Settlement relative
increase in the delinquency rate.
We address the first problem by identifying subsets of borrowers who were un-
likely to default in the absence of the Settlement. In particular, we hypothesize that
borrowers with access to substantial liquidity (through credit cards) or with some
positive equity in their houses would be much less likely to default otherwise. For
that purpose, we stratify our sample by levels of credit card utilization (utilization is
measured monthly) and CLTV. With respect to utilization, we identify three groups:
borrowers with access to credit equal to at least five months of mortgage payments
(“5+ Months”), those with available credit equal to two to four months of payments
(“2-4 Months”), and those with available credit equal to no more the one payment (“0-
1 Months”). We hypothesize that borrowers with high levels of available credit (e.g.,
“5+ Months”) are likely to be less liquidity constrained and therefore less vulnerable
to economic shocks than borrowers with lower levels of available credit. We similarly
separated borrowers into three groups based on their current CLTV: borrowers with
CLTV less than 100 (“above water”), those with CLTV between 100 and 120, and
those with CLTV greater than 120 (“underwater”). Again, we hypothesize that bor-
rowers with CLTV under 100 are less likely to default because they have some positive
housing equity.
Table 3 reruns our preferred specification—Column (4) in Table 2—for each
group of borrowers. Columns (1) through (3) separate borrowers by credit card utiliza-
tion, (4) through (6) separate them by CLTV. Note that the pre-Settlement rollover rate
is substantially lower among low utilization (5+ months) and above water (CTLV<100)
borrowers. Their rollover rates appear in the row labeled “Avg. Delinquency” at the
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bottom of the table. There we see that low utilization borrowers had a pre-Settlement
rollover rate (three percent) that was forty-five percent lower than the rollover rate
among borrowers with the lowest available credit (5.5 percent). Similarly, the rollover
rate among above-water borrowers (3.1 percent) was sixty percent lower than the rate
among under-water borrowers (7.8 percent). This confirms our hypothesis that these
borrowers should have relatively low default rates.
Separating borrowers by credit card utilization, Columns (1) through (3) show
that the effect of the Settlement was strongest among borrowers with the most available
credit. The relative increase in delinquency is greater than twenty percent among
borrowers in the“5+ Months” category, but only about twelve percent among borrowers
in the “2-4 Months” and “0-1 Months” categories. Equally important, Column (1)
shows no statistically significant pre-Settlement increase in rollover rates among low
utilization Countrywide borrowers. This increase appears only among borrowers with
relatively low available credit (Columns 2 and 3).
Together, these results are inconsistent with the possibility that idiosyncratic
economic shocks to Countrywide borrowers explain the differences between Country-
wide and the Control Group borrowers immediately after the Settlement announce-
ment. Our results—especially the absence of a pre-Settlement increase in rollover rates
among borrowers with higher available credit—also support the hypothesis that the
Settlement induced defaults among borrowers who were unlikely to default otherwise,
at least in the near future.
Separating borrowers by CLTV, we obtain comparable results in Columns (4)
through (6) of Table 3. We find sizeable post-Settlement effects (around fifteen percent)
among above-water Countrywide borrowers with CTLV<100, but observe no statisti-
cally significant pre-Settlement increase. The effect of the Settlement is comparable
among borrowers with mid-range CLTV (between 100 and 120), but smaller among
under-water borrowers (a 10.6 percent effect). Additionally, Countrywide borrowers
29
in each of the latter groups exhibit a pre-Settlement increase in rollover rates. These
results offer further support for the hypothesis that the Settlement induced defaults
among borrowers who were much less likely to default otherwise, at least in the near
future.
5.3 Effects of Settlement on Non-Targeted Debts
If the Settlement induced strategic default by Countrywide borrowers, we do
not expect to observe an effect of the Settlement on default rates for non-targeted
debts, such as second liens and credit card debt. To the contrary, we expect to ob-
serve Countrywide borrowers remaining current on these debts while defaulting on first
mortgages in order to obtain the benefits of the Settlement.
Table 4 tests the first hypothesis—that rollover rates for non-targeted debts
should not exhibit a post-Settlement increase among Countrywide borrowers, relative
to the Control Group. Columns (1) and (2) re-estimate our preferred specification, but
change the dependent variable to measure the probability of delinquency on a second
lien (Column 1) or on credit card debt (Column 2), conditional upon being current
two months earlier on the first lien. Column (1), for example, predicts a borrower’s
monthly probability of becoming delinquent on a second lien, conditional upon being
current sixty days earlier on his or her first mortgage. Borrowers are included in this
regressions only if they have a second lien (similarly, they are included in the regression
reported in Column 2 only if they have a credit card).
Column (1) shows that the delinquency rate for second liens increased slightly—
by 0.4 percent—among Countrywide borrowers (relative to the Control Group) during
the quarter immediately after the Settlement announcement. However, we find no ef-
fect of the Settlement on the delinquency rate for credit cards in Column (2). Columns
(3) through (6) re-run these regressions for low utilization (5+ Months Utilization) and
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above-water (CLTV<100) borrowers. Recall that, although these borrowers had the
lowest default rates on first mortgages prior to the Settlement, their rollover rates ex-
hibited the strongest response to the Settlement announcement (see Table 3). Columns
(3) through (6) show that, within each group of borrowers, there is no evidence that
delinquency rates on second liens and credit cards increased more among Countrywide
borrowers than among Control Group borrowers after the Settlement announcement.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that strategic default—not general economic
distress—is the driver of excess defaults among Countrywide first mortgages after the
Settlement. Indeed, Column (4) shows that credit card delinquency rates decreased
among low utilization Countrywide borrowers, relative to the Control Group, after
the Settlement announcement. This pattern suggests that some of the borrowers who
strategically defaulted on first mortgages might have used additional available cash
flow to service their credit card debts.
Table 5 tests the hypothesis that the Settlement induced Countrywide borrowers
to default on first mortgages while remaining current on other, non-targeted debts for
at least three months following the mortgage default. This type of default is consistent
with strategic behavior.37 Column (1) estimates the probability that a borrower became
sixty days delinquent on a first mortgage in month t, conditional (i) upon being current
on that mortgage in month t-2 and (ii) remaining current on a second lien at least
from month t until month t+3. Only borrowers with second liens are included in the
Column (1) regression. The covariates are the same as in our preferred specification
for the baseline model (Column 4 of Table 2). Column (2) estimates a similar model,
but changes the dependent variable to measure the probability of rolling from current
to sixty days delinquent on a first mortgage while, at the same time, remaining current
on credit cards for at least three months after becoming sixty days delinquent.
37Some industry observers have defined “strategic default” as a default on the first mortgage while
remaining current on credit cards for at least six months following the default. See Experian-Oliver
Wyman Market Intelligence Reports.
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In both Columns (1) and (2), we observe sizeable post-Settlement increases in
the probability that Countrywide borrowers (relative to the Control Group) roll from
current to sixty days delinquent while remaining current on other debts. The effect is
very large (around fifty-seven percent) in Column (1), but still sizeable (15.5 percent)
in Column (2). When we subset on low utilization borrowers in Columns (3) and
(4) and above-water borrowers in Columns (5) and (6), we generally find even larger
effects. For example, the probability of rolling from current to sixty days delinquent
while remaining current on second liens increased over 100 percent among Countrywide
borrowers, relative to the Control Group. These results provide additional support
for the hypothesis that the Settlement induced strategic default among Countrywide
borrowers. The results also point to a form of “debt substitution” in which borrowers
allocated their cash flow to non-targeted debts (credit card and second lien debts)
instead of targeted first mortgages. With respect to second liens, this debt substitution
effectively reverses the legal priorities of first and second liens: in response to the
Settlement announcement, Countrywide borrowers favored low-priority second liens at
the expense of high-priority first mortgages.
5.4 Strategic Defaults Among FRMs
To alleviate remaining concerns about our identification strategy, we examined
the behavior of borrowers with fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Although the Settlement
offered relief to subprime FRM borrowers, a substantial fraction of securitized FRMs
in our data are non-subprime loans offered to borrowers with relatively high credit
ratings. These “non-subprime FRMs” provide a useful control group: although the
Settlement could affect behavior among subprime FRM borrowers, we do not expect
to observe a post-Settlement change in the behavior of non-subprime FRM borrowers
(relative to non-subprime FRMs serviced by Control Group institutions).
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Subprime status is difficult to define because there is no single agreed-upon
definition. In order to be conservative, we define an FRM as “subprime” if origination
FICO was less than 620, a common threshold for subprime status.38 While some
borrowers with an above-620 FICO might also be considered subprime (because, for
example, they made low down payments), mortgages with a FICO below 620 are highly
likely to be viewed as subprime and thus qualify for modification under the Settlement
if they were also delinquent.
Tables 6 and 7 implement the probit specification in equation (1) for subprime
and non-subprime FRMs, respectively. Column (4) of Table 6 shows that the rollover
rate among subprime Countrywide borrowers increased substantially, relative to the
Control Group, immediately after the Settlement announcement.39 The effect amounts
to a thirty percent increase over the pre-Settlement delinquency rate among Country-
wide subprime FRMs (1.5 percent).40 Among non-subprime FRMs, Table 7 shows no
increase in Countrywide delinquencies relative to the Control Group (the coefficient is
negative and economically small).
Overall, these results parallel those we obtain for 2/28 ARMs: announcement
of the Settlement induced a substantial increase in relative rollover rates and strategic
defaults among Countrywide mortgages that were eligible for relief, but not among non-
Countrywide mortgages and not among Countrywide mortgages that were ineligible for
relief.
38Most lenders define a borrower as subprime if the borrower’s FICO credit score is below 620 on
a scale that ranges from 300 to 850. This is also how Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
Office of Thrift Supervision defines subprime status in their mortgage metrics reports. See also Keys
et al. (2010).
39In unreported regressions, we split both FRM samples by credit card utilization and current CLTV.
Among subprime FRMs, we found strong effects among borrowers with high available utilization and
low CLTV, though the effect for low CLTV borrowers was only marginally significant. Among non-
subprime FRMs, the effect of the Settlement was negative and often insignificant across all utilization
and CLTV buckets.
40We obtain similar but only marginally significant results in models similar to Column (4) that
include fully-interacted servicer fixed effects along the lines described in footnote 26. When we split
the sample by credit card utilization and current CLTV, the effects for high utilization and low CLTV
borrowers are positive and sizeable, but insignificant, due in part to relatively small sample sizes.
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6 Conclusion
The results in this paper provide evidence of strategic behavior by borrowers
who were willing to suspend mortgage payments in order to qualify for a newly an-
nounced mortgage modification. In the months immediately following the announce-
ment of the Countrywide Settlement, the number of Countrywide 2/28 ARMs borrow-
ers rolling from current to sixty days delinquent rose by more than thirteen percent
relative to comparable servicers whose mortgages were not covered by the legal settle-
ment. The estimated effects are stronger (up to over twenty percent) among those who
appear least likely to have defaulted otherwise: borrowers who had the most available
credit and those with lower current CLTVs.
We confirm that these results are not due to idiosyncratic features of Coun-
trywide borrowers: post-Settlement delinquency rates on non-targeted debts (second
liens and credit cards) do not differ meaningfully between Countrywide and Control
Group borrowers. To the contrary, we observe a pronounced increase in the likelihood
that Countrywide borrowers became delinquent on their first mortgage while remaining
current on credit cards or second liens, relative to borrowers in the Control Group.
We also confirm that our results are not due to idiosyncratic features of Coun-
trywide ARMs: we observe comparable effects among subprime FRMs (eligible for
relief under the Settlement), but not among non-subprime FRMs (ineligible).
Although our results document strategic behavior in response to mortgage mod-
ification policies—particularly policies that use simple but manipulable eligibility cri-
teria, such as requiring that homeowners be delinquent—we cannot say whether the
economic costs of strategic behavior are large relative to the potential gains to bor-
rowers, lenders, and neighborhoods from these policies. Our results instead highlight
a trade-off that merits further empirical investigation: mortgage modification policies
that use simple but potentially manipulable eligibility criteria (i) do generate econom-
ically meaningful strategic behavior, but (ii) may also offer benefits more quickly to
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homeowners at risk of default. More work must be done to assess the overall costs and
benefits of such modification policies and their effectiveness in preventing foreclosures,
both in the near term and in the long run.
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Figure 1: Index of Web Searches for the Term “Countrywide Modification,” as Re-
ported by Google Trends
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Figure 3: 2/28 ARMs: Current Interest Rate by Origination Quarter
48
Figure 4: 2/28 ARMs: Current Vantage Score by Origination Quarter
49
Figure 5: 2/28 ARMs: Current CLTV by Origination Quarter
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